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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 980035-CA 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JOSEPH K. KRUEGER and MARY ANN 
SAWYERS, Priority No. 10 
Defendants/Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues: The appellee concurs in the statement of the issues and standard of 
review as set forth in the appellants' brief, and therefore does not re-state the same 
here. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUES 
Constitutional Provisions 
U.S. Const, amend. I 
U.S. Const, amend. XIV 
Utah Const, art I, Sec. 15 
Statutes 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 78-3a-801(1)(a) (1996) 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-10-105 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-2-101 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-2-103 (1995) 
Utah Code Ann. Sec. 76-1-104 (1953) 
All constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules pertinent to the resolution of the 
issues before this Court are contained in the Addendum to this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Proceedings. 
This is an appeal from interlocutory orders of the Honorable Bryce K. Bryner, 
Seventh Judicial District Court, granting in part and denying in part appellants' Motion to 
Dismiss the Informations charging them with violating Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3a-
801(1)(a) (1996) — contributing to the delinquency of minors. 
B. The Course of the Proceedings. 
On May 2, 1997, the Carbon County Attorney filed two five-count Informations 
alleging that appellants Joseph K. Krueger and Mary Ann Sawyers each violated Utah 
Code Ann. Section 78-3a-801(1)(a) (1996). The charges arise from interviews these 
two journalists conducted with five Carbon High School students following an anti-
tobacco presentation at the school. Sawyers and Krueger entered not guilty pleas on 
June 17, 1997. 
Sawyers and Krueger timely filed a Motion to Dismiss the Informations. Oral 
2 
argument was heard on November 3, 1997. In support of their Motion, Sawyers and 
Krueger argued that the Informations should be dismissed principally for three reasons. 
First, Sawyers and Krueger did not have the requisite intent to violate the statute 
because they interacted with the students solely for the purpose of gathering 
information and videotaped pictures for a news story; Second, their alleged conduct did 
not violate the statute; Third, the First Amendment of the U. S. Constitution and Article 
I, Sections 15 of the Utah Constitution prohibit criminal prosecution of journalists for the 
news gathering activities involved here. At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Bryner 
dismissed one count of the Informations which concerned a student who was 18 years 
old at the time of the interviews and, accordingly, not a minor. On January 2, 1998, 
Judge Bryner issued a written ruling denying in part and granting in part appellants' 
Motion to Dismiss. This Court granted Sawyers' and Krueger's Petition for Interlocutory 
Appeal. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
(A copy of the police reports were submitted to the trial court as part of Exhibit 1 
of the defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss. This Statement of 
Facts is based on the narrative of Price City Police Chief Aleck Shilaos which is part of 
those reports. The full narrative is provided in the Addendum.) 
On Tuesday, February 18, 1997, Carbon High School sponsored an assembly 
concerning the issue of the use of smokeless tobacco. Rick Bender, a guest speaker, 
gave the presentation. Mr. Bender considers himself a victim of smokeless tobacco 
and travels throughout the USA giving such presentations. 
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The Carbon High School administration invited numerous news agencies to 
attend the assembly. KTVX, Channel 4, sent newswoman Mary Ann Sawyers and 
cameraman Joseph K. Krueger. 
Just prior to the assembly, Sawyers and Krueger contacted school employee Liz 
Ferguson and asked her to find students who used smokeless tobacco to be 
interviewed. Mrs. Ferguson asked both Sawyers and Krueger to interview some of the 
students that had been through a tobacco prevention seminar, but Sawyers and 
Krueger indicated that they would rather speak with kids who presently "chew". 
Mrs. Ferguson with the help of a teacher contacted students Travis Wilberg and 
Ryan Lee while these students were in gym class. Ferguson told the students that the 
news people wanted to interview them about their use of tobacco products. When 
asked if they could get into trouble, Ferguson told them that they could not get into 
trouble for being interviewed. Ferguson advised the police that she was not told that 
the actual use of tobacco products would be part of the interview. Both Wilberg and 
Lee were allowed to sit on the front row during the assembly so that they could be 
interviewed after the assembly to get their impressions about the presentation. 
After the assembly, Sawyers, Krueger, Wilberg and Lee left the school building 
and walked into the school parking lot. It was approximately 11:30 a.m. and lunch hour 
was just beginning. Other students were in the parking lot, and Sawyers and Krueger 
made contact with students Mike Andreini, Trevor Roberts, and Tyler Minchey. 
Student Wilberg reported that he asked Sawyers and Krueger if they wanted him 
to put "chew" in his mouth. He said that they told him that that would be good. Wilberg 
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reported that he heard Krueger ask other kids "if they would put chew under their lip." 
Wilberg said that he offered to use the chew for the news people and that they did not 
ask him to chew. He said that the news people told them to act like they weren't there 
so that it looked like they were doing it on their own. 
Student Lee reported that he asked Sawyers and Krueger if he could get into 
trouble for using chew on school property, and both defendants told him that he could 
not. Lee reported that Krueger told him that he wanted to see him put the chew in his 
mouth and also wanted to see him spit. Lee reported that he did both based on the fact 
that the defendants said that he could not get into trouble. 
Student Andreini reported that when the news people approached him he was 
told that he could be on television if he chewed. Andreini had chewing tobacco in his 
possession at the time. Andreini reported that Krueger asked him to put chew in his 
mouth, spit, and "pack the can" to be filmed for the interview. Andreini also reported 
that both Sawyers and Krueger asked if other students on the scene would chew for 
them and that Sawyers and Krueger also wanted to meet some of the baseball players 
that chewed. 
Student Roberts reported that he was with Andreini when Sawyers, Krueger, 
Wilberg and Lee arrived. Roberts reported that Sawyers asked him to chew. Roberts 
reported that he specifically asked Sawyers "are we going to get in trouble because we 
are on school property?" He reports that Sawyers told him "no" and that the school 
administration had said that it was okay. 
Student Roberts also reported that Krueger wanted some chew for himself which 
he took from Roberts. Krueger then placed the chew in his own mouth. 
Student Minchey reported that he was in the area when Sawyers, Krueger, Lee 
and Wilberg came on the scene. Minchey reported that he was asked to take a "dip" 
and to spit. He did both and then left the area to go to lunch. He reported that when he 
returned about fifteen minutes later everyone was still in the area and that Sawyers and 
Krueger were still filming and kids were still dipping, spitting, and doing other activities 
related to smokeless tobacco. Minchey also reported that he heard Krueger tell the 
kids that he wanted them to pretend that Krueger and Sawyers were not there. 
Other student witnesses at the scene supported the statements given by the 
above referenced students. 
KTVX, Channel 4, broadcast a segment on the evening of February 18, 1997, 
which included excerpts from Benders lecture and footage of the students chewing 
tobacco and commenting on the Bender presentation. 
Students Wilberg, Lee, Andreini, Roberts, and Minchey were all subsequently 
charged criminally for possession of tobacco in violation of UCA 76-10-105 (1996). 
Sawyers and Krueger were subsequently interviewed by an officer of the Price 
City Police Department. Sawyers indicated that neither she nor Krueger told students 
that they could not get into trouble for using tobacco. Sawyers said that she met 
Wilberg and Lee and asked them if they chewed. They told her that they did, and she 
asked them where and when they chewed. They told her in the parking lot during 
lunch. She asked them if they were going to chew on this date and was told that they 
were. They agreed to let her take pictures. She reported that when they walked into 
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the parking lot and met the other students that Wilberg and Lee asked what they were 
supposed to do. Sawyers reported that she told them that the news people were 
observers and not there to get them to do anything, and Sawyers implied that the 
chewing just began. 
Krueger reported that he never asked anyone to spit but he did see someone 
"packing the can." He said that he had not taken a picture of that activity and asked if 
the boys would do the packing again so that he could get a shot. This happened 
several times. Krueger indicated that he had been offered chew and did in fact accept. 
On May 2, 1997, the Carbon County Attorney filed an Information jointly charging 
Sawyers and Krueger with five counts of Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, a 
count for each of the students Wilberg, Lee, Andreini, Minchey, and Roberts. 
Sawyers and Krueger filed Motions to Dismiss the charges. Judge Bryner heard 
oral arguments on November 3, 1997. At that hearing, the State moved to dismiss the 
charge pertaining to Minchey, since the State had confirmed that Minchey was over the 
age of eighteen year when the incident occurred. The remaining four charges were 
amended, pursuant to the motion of the State, to clarify that each charge requires that 
the act was done "knowingly and intentionally." The Court also, pursuant to the 
stipulation of the parties, struck from the "to-wit" clause of each charge the language "or 
to use tobacco on school property". 
Judge Bryner issued a Ruling on Motion to Dismiss dated January 2, 1998. In 
the Ruling the Court states that the possession of tobacco had already been committed 
by the students, but the Court noted that there was a factual dispute as to whether the 
students had been told to chew tobacco on camera. The Court concluded that it would 
be impermissible, at that juncture, for the Court to determine which of the two versions 
of the facts, if either, was correct, and the Court concluded that such a decision should 
be left to the fact finder. The Court ruled that"... the fact finder could also find that the 
defendant prolonged the time during which the students were committing an ongoing 
offense, and that by prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the 
defendant tended to cause "minors to remain delinquent" in violation of 78-3a-
801(1)(ii)." 
As to the defendants' claim that the Utah Statute was unconstitutionally vague, 
Judge Bryner ruled "The Court finds that the wording of the statute in question is 
sufficiently specific to apprise reporters of proscribed conduct. The Court is mindful that 
reporters have a constitutionally protected right to report illegal activity, but the issue 
this case presents is whether the defendant as a reporter exceeded the scope of that 
right by allegedly going one step further and engaging in conduct that tended to cause 
minors to engage in the illegal activity being reported or to continue in the illegality." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
News reporters certainly have a right to interview persons and to take 
photographs of even illegal activities in progress. They do not, however, have the right 
to stage such video reporting by recruiting teenagers to proceed to a school parking lot 
and to demonstrate a continued violation of State law. Such reporters definitely have 
no legal right to actively participate with young people in the violation of State law by 
using tobacco with them, and do not have the right to encourage an illegal activity in 
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order to cover a story. Because of the different statements given by the defendants 
and by the students, only the trier of fact can determine what actually occurred. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHETHER THE APPELLANTS CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
DELINQUENCY OF MINORS IS A QUESTION OF FACT 
TO BE DECIDED BY A TRIER OF FACT. 
A. It is the exclusive province of a trier of fact 
to determine if the elements of a crime are 
established by the evidence presented. 
It is a well-established principal of criminal law in Utah that it is the 
exclusive province of a jury, or other trier of fact, to hear the evidence and determine 
the facts from that evidence, and then apply the law to the facts to reach a verdict. In 
State v. Lawrence 234 P.2d 600, (Utah 1951), the Utah Supreme Court held: 
Notwithstanding the occasional incongruous result, this 
system of submitting all of the facts in criminal cases to the 
jury and letting them be the exclusive judges thereof has 
lasted for some little time now and with a fair degree of 
success. If the result in individual cases at times seems 
illogical, we can be consoled by the words of Mr. Justice 
Holmes, that in some areas of the law, 'a page of history is 
worth a volume of logic.' We, who live with it, have a fervent 
devotion to the jury system, in spite of its faults. 
Similarly in State v. Harris, 264 P.2d 284 (Utah 1953), the Utah Supreme Court, 
citing with approval State v. Green 6 P.2d 177 held: 
As stated by Mr. Justice Elias Hansen: "It is the sole and 
exclusive province of the jury to determine the facts in all 
criminal cases, whether the evidence offered by the state is 
weak or strong, is in conflict or is not controverted." 
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Clearly, the trial court in the instant case did not err when finding that 
"Because the fact-finder could find that the defendant [Sawyers] asked the 
students to chew tobacco on camera that was already in the student's 
possession, the fact-finder could also find that the defendant prolonged 
the time during which the students were committing an ongoing offense, 
and that by prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the 
defendant tended to cause 'minors to remain delinquent' in violation of 78-
3a-801(1)(ii). 
Although the appellants have assumed certain facts for purposes of this appeal, 
they conveniently ignore defendant Krueger's admission to the Price City Police that he 
personally chewed tobacco with the students, which was given to him by a student.1 
The State does not agree that the appellants' assumed facts are correct. As it is the 
clear province of a trier of fact to determine what actually occurred between the 
appellants and the students, this matter should be tried, and the facts found at trial 
applied to the law. 
B. The Appellants were in fact "encouraging" the 
minor children to violate the law and their actions 
did "tend to cause minors to become or remain 
delinquent." 
The appellants rely on a strict legal interpretation of the term possession when 
asking the Court to find that they have not violated section 78-3a-801(1)(a) relative to 
the students' possession and use of tobacco in the appellants' presence. It is clear that 
^ee Police Reports Narrative, Addendum Attached. 
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the students' use of the tobacco products presupposes possession. 
In this matter, the appellants not only were aware of the students' possession of 
tobacco, but intentionally encouraged the students to use the tobacco products, and in 
Krueger's case, joined the students in chewing the tobacco. This is clearly supportive of 
a violation of law, and just as clearly tends to cause the students to remain delinquent, 
within the meaning of the Utah Statute. 
The appellants urge a strict reading of §78-3a-801(1)(ii) which is not supported 
by Utah law. Utah Code Annotated §76-1-106 states: 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall 
not apply to this code, any of its provisions, or any offense 
defined by the laws of this state. All provisions of this code 
and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be 
construed according to the fair import of their terms to 
promote justice and to effect the objects of the law and 
general purposes of Section 76-1-104. 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-1-104(1) states, in part: 
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance 
with these general purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses. 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which 
constitute each offense and safeguard conduct that is 
without fault from condemnation as criminal. ... (Emphasis 
added.) 
The clear intent of the legislature is to allow the trier of fact some latitude in 
interpreting the criminal statutes to prevent the commission of offenses in the state. A 
trier of fact could reasonably find that the appellants' actions fall within the bounds of 
§78-3a-801(1)(ii), and that the appellants are indeed guilty of violating that law. 
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C. The appellants had the requisite intent to 
violate the law. 
In STATE V. TRITT463 P.2d 806, 23 Utah 2d 365 (Utah 1970), the Utah 
Supreme Court held a physician liable for contributing to the delinquency of a minor, 
finding that the physician had the requisite mental state, even though the minor child 
misinformed the physician. In interpreting former Utah Code Annotated §76-1-20, the 
Court held that 
The difficulty with the defendant's position in urging the 
necessity of affirmatively showing a criminal intent, under 
76-1-20 above quoted, is that he entirely ignores the final 
clause "or criminal negligence." This concededly imports 
something more serious than the negligence upon which 
liability is predicated in civil wrongs. It connotes some 
blameworthy conduct which shows careless disregard for 
adherence to legal duty and for the rights and safety of 
others. 
Currently, under the definition of knowingly set forth in Utah Code Annotated 
§76-2-103(2) there is little question that the appellants knew that possession of tobacco 
by a minor was illegal, and any reasonable person would know that encouraging a 
minor to chew tobacco, for whatever reason, was contributing to that minor's continued 
delinquency, that is, the possession of the tobacco. Certainly, the appellants knew that 
their conduct in encouraging the students to chew tobacco would be contributing to the 
minors' continued delinquency, and a trier of fact could reasonably so find. 
D. Journalists are not immune from criminal 
prosecution. 
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Appellants assert in their brief that they cannot be held criminally liable 
"because their intent was not to tempt minors to illegal conduct, but rather to cover a 
news story thoroughly;..." and that journalists in the process of reporting the news 
somehow cannot have the requisite intent to aid in the commission of a crime. The 
United State Supreme Court disagrees with this analysis. In Cohen v. Cowles Media 
Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) the Court held that news gathering can be circumscribed by 
the law: 
This case however, is not controlled by this line of cases but 
rather by the equally well-established line of decisions 
holding that generally applicable laws do not offend the First 
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the 
press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report 
the news. 
As the cases relied on by respondents recognize, the truthful 
information sought to be published must have been lawfully 
acquired. The press may not with impunity break and enter 
an office or dwelling to gather news. (Emphasis Added) 
Similarly, the press may not "tend to cause minors to become or remain 
delinquent" to gather news. Simply put, journalists in the process of reporting the news 
must, as every other citizen, obey the law. To urge that the process of news gathering 
somehow purges a person of the necessary intent to commit a crime is a specious 
argument at best. Whether the appellants had the necessary intent to violate the law in 
this matter is a question for the trier of fact to determine, not a matter of law susceptible 
to bright line analysis. 
The appellants rely on the holding of Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 128 
F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1997) for the proposition that the act of news reporting insulates the 
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reporter from the intent necessary to commit a crime. However, the comment cited by 
the appellants is at best dicta to the main holding of Rice, which was a case dealing 
with First Amendment protection for a book publisher. The federal court held that 
Paladin Enterprises, a publisher, could be held liable in damages to the family of 
persons who had been murdered by a contract murderer based on information found in 
a guidebook for the commission of contract murder published by Paladin, under a 
theory of aiding and abetting. The Rice court held that the First Amendment offered no 
protection for Paladin under the Brandenburg v. Ohio theory of protected speech.2 
The Rice court, citing Cohen, went on to hold that 
However, while even speech advocating lawlessness has 
long enjoyed protections under the First Amendment, it is 
equally well established that speech, which, in its effect, is 
tantamount to legitimately proscribable nonexpressive 
conduct, may itself be legitimately proscribed, punished, or 
regulated incidentally to the constitutional enforcement of 
generally applicable statutes. 
As the Supreme Court and Courts of appeals have held that the First 
Amendment cannot prohibit the regulation of protected speech in some incidents, so 
much more so the First Amendment offers no protection to news gatherers who violate 
the law in the process of covering a story. 
II. THE PROSECUTION OF THE APPELLANTS 
WITHSTANDS CONSTITUTIONAL SCRUTINY 
Brandenburg v. Ohio 395 U.S. 444 (1969), wherein the United States Supreme Court held 
that abstract advocacy of lawlessness is protected speech under the First Amendment. 
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A. Utah Code Annotated §78-3a-801 (1 )(a)(ii) is 
not unconstitutionally vague as applied to 
these appellants. 
If the appellants had happened upon the students at Carbon High School 
and merely started filming them in the parking lot chewing tobacco, then the argument 
that Utah Code Annotated § 78-3a-801(1)(a)(ii) as applied in this case is too vague 
may have merit. 
However, in this case, the participation of the appellants went far beyond mere 
filming of the students' actions. By his own admission, defendant Krueger joined the 
students in chewing tobacco. The appellants sought out certain students to arrange a 
meeting and asked them if they would chew tobacco while being filmed, and asked the 
students to spit and "pack the can" so they could be filmed. There is an enormous 
difference in merely observing the students using tobacco as opposed to orchestrating 
and outright participation in an act which is criminal, particularly when participating in an 
act which the appellants could clearly discern was illegal on the part of the students. 
The statute is far from vague, particularly applied in this situation. As the Utah 
Supreme Court state in State v. Tritt. 
The terms "delinquency" and "contributing to the 
delinquency" as applied to minors has for many decades 
had such widespread usage as to give clear and 
understandable meaning6 that it denotes actions that will 
aid, encourage or involve children in conduct which is 
contrary to law, or which is so contrary to the generally 
accepted standards of decency and morality that its result 
will be substantially harmful to the mental, moral or physical 
well-being of the child. 
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The Alabama case cited by the appellants is inapposite to this situation, as that 
case applied a contributing statute in the context of an obscenity law, which may or may 
not be crime, depending upon prevailing community standards, and not a clear cut line 
such as the possession of tobacco by a minor. In refusing to address a vagueness 
question relative to Utah's contributing statute, the Utah Supreme Court held in State v. 
Tritt 
Assuming that there may be conduct of some nature which 
would fall in doubtful areas as to whether it constitutes 
contributing to the delinquency of a minor, it is unnecessary 
for us to be here concerned with conduct in such twilight 
zones because the charge against the defendant is not of 
that character. The conduct here charged would amount to 
the commission of a crime, which by any definition 
whatsoever, constitutes contributing to the delinquency of a 
minor. 
It is clear that the Utah statute as applied in this instance is anything but vague, 
and the appellants, like all other citizens were adequately apprised that they would be 
subject to criminal prosecution for contributing to the delinquency of minors. 
CONCLUSION 
The law is clear that journalists must gather and report the news in a responsible 
manner, and cannot violate the law in the course of their professional activities. It is 
equally clear that journalists cannot use the First Amendment as a shield when 
16 
newsgathering crosses the line to criminal behavior. This case should be heard by a 
jury to determine whether the appellants in this matter crossed that line. 
DATED this 26th day of June, 1998. 
Gene Strate 
Carbon County Attorney 
John E. Schindler 
George M. Harmond, Jr. 
Deputy County Attorneys 
Attorneys for Appellee 
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A D D E N D U M 
Constitutional Provisions and Statutes 
AMENDMENTS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED 
STATES 
AMENDMENTS I-X [BILL OF RIGHTS] 
AMENDMENTS XI-XXVI 
AMENDMENT I 
[Religious and political freedom.] 
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of 
the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances. 
AMENDMENT II 
[Right to bear arms.] 
A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the 
right of the people to keep and bear Anns, shall not be infringed. 
AMENDMENT III 
[Quartering soldiers.] 
No Soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house, without the 
consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by 
law. 
AMENDMENT IV 
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.] 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized. 
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AMENDMENTS Amend. XIV, § 3 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section Section 
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of 
protection.] the Confederacy and claims not 
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce ap- to be paid.] 
pointment.] 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment.] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United Statesr or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
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A m e n d . XIV, § 4 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any 
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, 
and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16, 
1866; declared to have been ratified by three-
fourths of all the states on July 28, 1868. 
AMENDMENT XV 
Section Section 
1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
to disqualify.] 
Section 1. [Right of citizens to vote — Race or color not to 
disqualify.] 
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or 
abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or 
previous condition of servitude. 
Sec. 2. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion. 
History: Proposed by Congress on February more than three-fourths of all the states on 
27, 1869; declared to have been ratified by March 30, 1870. 
AMENDMENT XVI 
[Income tax.] 
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, 
and without regard to any census or enumeration. 
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Art. I, § 15 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
P.2d 1302 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894, 
104 S. Ct. 241, 78 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1983). 
Cited in State v. Droneburg, 781 P.2d 1301 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Recent Developments 
in Utah Law — Judicial Decisions — Constitu-
tional Law, 1987 Utah L. Rev. 82. 
Note, State v. Nielsen: Immaterial False 
Statements in Search Warrant AfEidavits, 1987 
Utah L. Rev. 753. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Legis-
lative Enactments — Labor Law, 1988 Utah L. 
Rev. 284. 
Recent Developments in Utah Law — Judi-
cial Decisions — Criminal Procedure, 1989 
Utah L. Rev. 223. 
Brigham Young Law Review. — An Ana-
lytical Model to Assure Consideration of Pa-
rental and Familial Interests When Defining 
the Constitutional Rights of Minors — An Ex-
amination of In re Scott K., 1980 B.Y.U. L. 
Rev. 598. 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Note 
discussing "open fields" doctrine, 11 J. 
Contemp. L. 531 (1985). 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 68 Am. Jur. 2d Searches 
and Seizures § 6 et seq. 
C.J.S. — 79 C.J.S. Searches and Seizures 
§ 3 et seq. 
A.L.R. — Admissibility, in civil case, of evi-
dence obtained by unlawful search and seizure, 
5 A.L.R.3d 670. 
Lawfulness of seizure of property used in vio-
lation of law as prerequisite to forfeiture action 
or proceeding, 8 A.L.R.3d 473. 
Validity of consent to search given one in 
custody of officers, 9 A.L.R.3d 858. 
Traffic violation: lawfulness of search of mo-
tor vehicle following arrest for traffic violation, 
10 A.L.R.3d 314. 
Propriety of considering hearsay or other in-
competent evidence in establishing probable 
cause for issuance of search warrant, 10 
A.L.R.3d 359. 
Criminal liability for obstructing process as 
affected by invalidity or irregularity of the pro-
cess, 10 A.L.R.3d 1146. 
Sufficiency of description, in search warrant, 
of apartment or room to be searched in multi-
ple-occupancy structure, 11 A.L.R.3d 1330. 
Modern status of rule as to validity of 
nonconsentual search and seizure made with-
out warrant after lawful arrest as affected by 
lapse of time between, or difference in places 
of, arrest and search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727. 
Plea of guilty as waiver of claim of unlawful 
search and seizure, 20 A.L.R.3d 724. 
Propriety of execution of search warrant at 
nighttime, 26 A.L.R.3d 951. 
Propriety of governmental eavesdropping on 
communications between accused and his at-
torney, 44 A.L.R.4th 841. 
Validity of arrest made in reliance upon un-
corrected or outdated warrant list or similar 
police records, 45 A.L.R.4th 550. 
Officer's ruse to gain entry as affecting ad-
missibility of plain-view evidence—modern 
cases, 47 A.L.R.4th 425. 
Search and seizure: necessity that police ob-
tain warrant before taking possession of, ex-
amining, or testing evidence discovered in 
search by private person, 47 A.L.R.4th 501. 
Eavesdropping on extension telephone as in-
vasion of privacy, 49 A.L.R.4th 430. 
Propriety of state or local government health 
officer's warrantless search — post-Camara 
cases, 53 A.L.R.4th 1168. 
Seizure of books, documents, or other papers 
under search warrant not describing such 
items, 54 A.LR.4th 391. 
Search and seizure of telephone company 
records pertaining to subscriber as violation of 
subscriber's constitutional rights, 76 A.L.R.4th 
536. 
Necessity that Miranda warnings include ex-
press reference to right to have attorney 
present during interrogation, 77 A.L.R. Fed. 
123. 
Fourth Amendment as prohibiting strip 
searches of arrestees or pretrial detainees, 78 
A.L.R. Fed. 201. 
Key Numbers. — Searches and Seizures *=» 
2, 7(1). 
Sec. 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Libel.] 
No law shall be passed to abridge or restrain the freedom of speech or of the 
press. In all criminal prosecutions for libel the truth may be given in evidence 
to the jury; and if it shall appear to the jury that the matter charged as 
libelous is true, and was published with good motives, and for justifiable ends, 
the party shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine the 
law and the fact. 
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GENERAL PROVISIONS 76-1-104 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Offense defined outside Criminal Code. 
Sentencing. 
—After effective date of Code. 
Under statute subsequently amended. 
Offense defined outside Criminal Code. 
The Controlled Substances Act expressly and 
specifically establishes the offense of arranging 
for the distribution of a controlled substance; 
therefore, pursuant to former § 58-37-19 and 
this section, defendant was required to be 
charged with that offense under § 58-37-
8(lXaXiv) of the Controlled Substances Act, 
and it was error to charge him under § 76-2-
202 of the Criminal Code. State v. Hicken, 659 
P.2d 1038 (Utah 1983). 
A person cannot be charged with aiding and 
abetting another when he or she handles the 
negotiations and price of a controlled sub-
stance, but must instead be charged with 
agreeing, consenting, offering, or negotiating to 
distribute a controlled substance as specifically 
provided in § 58-37-8(lXaXiv). State v. Scott, 
732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987). 
Whenever culpable conduct arises under the 
Controlled Substance Act and is specifically 
defined by it, trial courts must reject instruc-
tions to the jury under more general provisions 
outside the act. State v. Scott, 732 R2d U7 
(Utah 1987). 
Sentencing. 
—After effective date of Code. 
Nonstatutory law existing at the time of 
commission of crime included decisions holding 
accused entitled to benefit of lesser punishment 
if penalty for offense is reduced before imposi-
tion of sentence; therefore, one convicted of 
passing check without sufficient funds in viola-
tion of former Section 76-20-11 was entitled to 
be sentenced under Jess severe provisions of 
Section 76-6-505 of the new Criminal Code. 
State v. Saxton, 30 Utah 2d 456, 519 P.2d 1340 
(1974). 
In sentencing defendant who had pled guilty 
to sodomy under former Section 76-53-22, trial 
judge was not required to take into account 
reduced penalty for the crime under new stat-
ute, since it divided former offense into crimes 
of "sodomy" and "forcible sodomy," so that tech-
nically the penalty for the crime of which de-
fendant was convicted was not reduced, and 
because trial judge did take change in law into 
account and held hearing to determine which 
provision of new code applied to defendant's 
act, defendant could not complain of entry of 
sentence under "forcible sodomy" provisions. 
State v. Atkinson, 532 P.2d 215 (Utah 1975). 
Under statute subsequently amended. 
Law in effect at time of sentencing, not law in 
effect at time of incarceration, governed sen-
tence to be served; defendant who was con-
victed and sentenced for forgery before amend-
ment of applicable statute to provide a lesser 
penalty but who was not incarcerated until 
after the amendment was not entitled to be 
resentenced under the amended statute; sen-
tencing under old statute was not a denial of 
equal protection. Harris v. Smith, 541 P.2d 343 
(Utah 1975). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law 
§ 7. 
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 25. 
Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 1206. 
76-1-104. Purposes and principles of construction. 
The provisions of this code shall be construed in accordance with these 
general purposes. 
(1) Forbid and prevent the commission of offenses. 
(2) Define adequately the conduct and mental state which constitute 
each offense and safeguard conduct that is without fault from condemna-
tion as criminal. 
(3) Prescribe penalties which are proportionate to the seriousness of 
offenses and which permit recognition or differences in rehabilitation 
possibilities among individual offenders. 
(4) Pr§yent arbitrary or oppressive treatment of persons accused or 
convicted of offenses. 
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76-1-105 CRIMINAL CODE 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-104, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-104. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Proportionate penalties. Determining whether the penalty is propor-
A case-by-case (comparative) proportionality tionate to the crime requires a careful and 
review was not required in response to defen- thoughtful consideration of the individual de-
dant's contention that his sentence of death fendant and the circumstances surrounding his 
was disproportionate to the crime committed, crime. Focus on the individual defendant and 
the immunity granted his accomplice, and the his acts is called for in this section, not corn-
sentences meted out in other first-degree mur- parison with other criminals and their crimes, 
der cases. State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah State v. Gardner, 789 R2d 273 (Utah 1989), 
1987), cert, denied, Tillman v. Cook, U.S. cert denied, 459 U.S. 988,110 S. Ct. 1837,108 
, 114 S. Ct. 706, 126 L. Ed. 2d 671 (1994). L. Ed. 2d 965 (1990). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law C.J.S. — 22 C. J.S. Criminal Law § 25. 
§§ 9,18. Key Numbers. —- Criminal Law «=» 13. 
76-1-105. Common law crimes abolished. 
Common law crimes are abolished and no conduct is a crime unless made so 
by this code, other applicable statute or ordinance. 
History: C. 1953, 76-1-105, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-1-105; 1974, ch. 32, § 1. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS punishment and clearly covering the conduct. 
. .. . , Ogden City v. McLaughlin, 5 Utah 387, 16 P. 
Common law crimes abolished.
 7 2 l (1888) 
Necessity for statute or ordinance.
 S i n c e c^moojKW c r i m e s w e r e a b o l i s h e d 
and court could not impose penalties unless the 
Common law crimes abolished. penalties were authorized by statute or ordi-
The Criminal Code explicitly abolishes all nance, statute or ordinance that failed to attach 
common law crimes. State v. Maestas, 652 P.2d penalty to crime or offenses was inoperative. 
903 (Utah 1982). Roe v. Lundstrom, 89 Utah 520, 57 P.2d 1128 (1936). 
Necessity for statute or ordinance. 
Conduct, no matter how reprehensible, was Cited in State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 
not punishable in absence of a law authorizing (Utah 1991). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law C.J.S. — 22 C. J.S. Criminal Law § 24. 
§ 7. Key Numbers. — Criminal Law <s=» 11. 
76-1-106. Strict construction rule not applicable. 
The rule that a penal statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply to this 
code, any of its provisions, or any offense defined by the laws of this state. All 
provisions of this code and offenses defined by the laws of this state shall be 
construed according to the fair import of their terms to promote justice and to 
effect the objects of the law and general purposes of Section 76-1-104. 
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PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-101 
Section 
76-2-305. Mental illness — Use as a de-
fense — Influence of alcohol 
or other substance voluntar-
ily consumed — Definition. 
76-2-306. Voluntary intoxication, 
76-2-307. Voluntary termination of efforts 
prior to offense. 
76-2-308. Affirmative defenses. 
Part 4 
Justification Excluding Criminal 
Responsibility 
76-2-401. Justification as defense — 
When allowed. 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-101, enacted by L. 
1973, cb. 196, § 76-2-101; 1983, cb. 90, § 1; 
1983, cb. 98, § 1. 
ANALYSIS 
Criminal negligence. 
Mental state. 
Criminal negligence. 
The bending down of a stop sign at an inter-
section so that it was not visible to traffic was 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980). 
Mental state. 
Public officer was not punishable for an act 
committed innocently without criminal intent, 
where statute, with no reference to mental 
Section 
76-2-402. Force in defense of person — 
Forcible felony defined. 
76-2-403. Force in arrest. 
76-2-404. Peace officer's use of deadly 
force. 
76-2-405. Force in defense of habitation. 
76-2-406. Force in defense of property. 
state, made private appropriation of public 
money a felony. State v. Blue, 17 Utah 175,53 P. 
978 (1898). 
In prosecution for grand larceny of steer, trial 
court's refusal to permit defendant to testify as 
to his intent and belief in possessing and claim-
ing animal was erroneous. State v. Sawyer, 54 
Utah 275, 182 P. 206 (1919). 
Intent was an essential element of first de-
gree murder; it was reversible error to refuse to 
allow defendant to testify in regard thereto. 
State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350, 2 P.2d 1050, 79 
A.L.R. 878 (1931). 
PARTI 
CULPABILITY GENERALLY 
76-2-101. Requirements of criminal conduct and criminal 
responsibility. 
No person is guilty of an offense unless his conduct is prohibited by law and: 
(1) He acts intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negli-
gence, or with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining 
the offense, as the definition of the offense requires; or 
(2) His acts constitute an offense involving strict liability. 
These standards of criminal responsibility shall not apply to the violations 
set forth in Title 41, Chapter 6, unless specifically provided by law. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 76-2-103 
76-2-103. Definitions of "intentionally, or with intent or 
willfully"; "knowingly, or with knowledge"; 
"recklessly, or maliciously"; and "criminal negli-
gence or criminally negligent." 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of 
his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective 
or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of 
his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that 
his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to circumstances surround-
ing his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware of but 
consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the 
standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when 
he ought to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such a 
nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would exercise 
in all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
History: C. 1953, 76-2-103, enacted by L. 
1973, ch. 196, § 76-2-103; 1974, ch. 32, § 4. 
ANALYSIS 
Criminal negligence. 
—Expert testimony. 
Malice. 
Proof of intent and malice. 
Recklessness. 
Willfulness. 
Cited. 
Criminal negligence. 
The bending down of a stop sign at an inter-
section so that it was not visible to traffic was 
sufficient to constitute criminal negligence. 
State v. Hallett, 619 P.2d 335 (Utah 1980). 
The sole difference between reckless man-
slaughter and negligent homicide is whether 
the defendant actually knew of the risk of death 
or was not, but should have been, aware of it. In 
both cases, a defendant's conduct must be a 
"gross deviation" from the standard of care 
exercised by an ordinary person. Thus, ordi-
nary negligence, which is the basis for a civil 
action for damages, is not sufficient to consti-
tute criminal negligence. State v. Standiford, 
769 P.2d 254 (Utah 1988). 
—Expert testimony. 
While expert testimony is not required to 
prove the mental state of a criminal defendant 
accused of homicide, expert testimony is re-
quired where criminal negligence is alleged and 
the nature and degree of risk are beyond the 
ken of the average layperson. State v. Warden, 
784 P.2d 1204 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reVd on 
other grounds, 813 P.2d 1146 (Utah 1991). 
Trial court committed no abuse of discretion 
in allowing physicians to testify at defendant 
physician's trial for negligent homicide involv-
ing the death of an infant after a premature 
home delivery. State v. Warden, 784 P.2d 1204 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989), rev*d on other grounds, 
813 P,2d 1146 (Utah 1991). 
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OFFENSES AGAINST PUBLIC HEALTH AND SAFETY 76-10-105.1 
History: C. 1953,76-10-104, enacted by L. as enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104, 
1974, ch. 32, § 39; 1989, ch. 194, § 1. relating to use of cigars, cigarettes or tobacco in 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws enclosed public place, and enacted present 
1974,ch.32,§ 39 repealed former § 76-10-104, § 76-10-104. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 16. minors, 55 A.L.R.4th 1238. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants §§ 92, 95. Key Numbers. — Infants *» 13. 
AXJL — Civil liability for tobacco sales to 
76-10-105. Buying or possessing cigars, cigarettes, or to-
bacco by minors — Penalty — Compliance officer 
authority — Juvenile court jurisdiction. 
(1) Any person under the age of 19 years who buys, accepts, or has in his 
possession any cigar, cigarette, or tobacco in any form is guilty of a class C 
misdemeanor, or may be subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
(2) A compliance officer appointed by a board of education under Section 
53A-3-402 may issue citations for violations of this section committed on school 
property. Cited violations shall be reported to the appropriate juvenile court. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-105, enacted by L. relating to abuse of psychotoxic chemical sol-
1974, ch. 32, § 40; 1986, ch. 26, § 19; 1988, vents, and enacted present § 76-10-105. For 
ch. 2, § 341; 1989, ch. 194, § 2. present provisions regarding psychotoxic 
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws chemical solvents, see § 76-10-107. 
1974, ch. 32, § 40 repealed former § 76-10-105 Cross-References. — Juvenile court juris-
(enacted by L. 1973, ch. 196, § 76-10-104), diction, § 78-3a-16. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 42 Am. Jur. 2d Infants § 15. Key Numbers. — Infants ®=» 68. 
C.J.S. — 43 C.J.S. Infants § 196. 
76-10-105.1. Prohibition of gift or sale of cigarettes or 
tobacco through vending machines — Excep-
tions — Penalties. 
(1) Except as provided in Subsection (2), the gift or sale of cigarettes or 
tobacco in any form through vending machines or tobacco product machines is 
prohibited in this state. 
(2) (a) A bar, or a privately owned and operated club or association that has 
a private club liquor license under Title 32A, Chapter 5, or that requires 
membership and charges a membership fee, may maintain cigarette or 
tobacco product vending machines on its premises. 
(b) A workplace may maintain cigarette or tobacco product vending 
machines for its adult employees, in an area not available to the general 
public. 
(3) Violation of this section is a class C misdemeanor on the first offense, a 
class B misdemeanor on the second offense, and a class A misdemeanor on 
subsequent offenses. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-105.1, enacted by 
L. 1989, ch. 194, § 3. 
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78-3a-801 JUDICIAL CODE 
PART 8 
ADULT OFFENSES 
78-3a-801. Jurisdiction of adults for offenses against mi-
nors — Proof of delinquency not required for 
conviction. 
(1) The court shall have concurrent jurisdiction to try the following adults 
for offenses committed against minors: 
(a) any person 18 years of age or older who: 
(i) solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids 
or who acts with a minor in the violation of any federal, state, or local 
law or municipal ordinance; 
(ii) tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent; or 
(iii) aids, contributes to, or becomes responsible for the neglect, 
abuse, or delinquency of any minor; 
(b) any person 18 years or older, having a minor in his legal custody, or 
under his care, or in his employment, who willfully abuses or ill-treats, 
neglects, or abandons the minor in any manner likely to cause the minor 
unnecessary suffering or serious injury to his health or morals; 
(c) any person 18 years or older who: 
(i) forcibly takes away a minor from, or wrongfully encourages him 
to leave, the legal or physical custody of any person, agency, or 
institution in which the minor lawfully resides or has been legally 
placed for the purpose of care, support, education, or adoption; or 
(ii) knowingly detains or harbors a minor whom he has reasonable 
grounds to believe has escaped or fled from the custody of any agency 
or institution in which the minor lawfully resides or has run away 
from his parent, guardian, or custodian; 
(d) any person 18 years of age or older who: 
(i) provides a minor with an alcoholic beverage or a controlled 
substance; or 
(ii) encourages or permits a minor to consume an alcoholic bever-
age or controlled substance; or 
(e) any person 18 years of age or older who fails to report child abuse, as 
required by Title 62A, Chapter 4a, Part 4, Child Abuse or Neglect 
Reporting Requirements. 
(2) It is not necessary in order to obtain a conviction under this statute to 
establish that the minor had become a delinquent or committed a delinquent 
act. 
History: C. 1953,78-3a-801, enacted by L. Effective Dates. - Laws 1996, ch. 1, § 94 
1996, ch. 1, § 72. makes the act effective on January 31, 1996. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Contributing to delinquency of minor. 
Contributing to delinquency of minor. — Evidence sufficient. 
— Evidence sufficient. Where defendant, an osteopathic physician, 
— Proof beyond reasonable doubt. gave prescriptions for excessive quantities of 
Sheltering runaway child. amphetamines and barbiturates to a seven-
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INVESTIGATION 
On Tuesday, February 18, 1997, at about 1030 hours Carbon High School 
sponsored an assembly concerning the issue of "smokeless tobacco". A guest 
speaker by the name of Mr. Rick Bender gave the presentation. Mr. Bender 
considers himself to be the victim of "smokeless tobacco" and travels 
throughout the U.S.A. giving presentations. 
Mrs. Liz Ferguson and Mrs. Rebecca Murphy were instrumental in helping 
arrange for this presentation by Mr. Bender. Both Ferguson and Murphy had 
also invited numerous NEWS agencies to attend the assembly. Channel 4, KTVX 
responded to the request by sending NEWS-Woman Mary A. Sawyers and Cameraman 
Joseph Krueger to cover the assembly. The coverage was to review the issue 
of "smokeless tobacco" as it relates to rural Utah. 
Mrs. Ferguson reports she made the contact with the employees of KTVX just 
prior to the assembly. Both Sawyers and Krueger asked her to find students 
who used "smokeless tobacco" (chew) to be interviewed. Mrs. Ferguson reports 
that she asked both Sawyers and Krueger to interview some of the kids that 
have been through tobacco prevention seminars as she felt that would be a 
more positive approach to the topic. Sawyers and Krueger indicated that they 
would rather speak with kids who presently "chew". 
Mrs. Ferguson, with the help of Mrs. Dupin, contacted V3 Wilburg and V2 Lee 
in the gym class. Both indicated that they "chew" and both wanted to be 
interviewed on camera. Mrs. Ferguson told the youths that the NEWS people 
only wanted to interview them about their use of tobacco products. When 
asked if they could get in trouble, Ferguson told them they could not get in 
trouble for being interviewed. Mrs. Ferguson reports that at no time was she 
told or ever knew that the actual use of a tobacco product was going to be 
part of the interview. Both boys were allowed to sit on the front row during 
the assembly and were going to be interviewed after the assembly to get their 
impressions and feelings about "smokeless tobacco" after the presentation. 
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After the assembly Lee, Wilberg, Krueger, and Sawyers left the school 
building and walked into the parking lot of the school. It was 1130 hours 
and lunch hour was just beginning. they walked to the west end of the lot 
near several trucks were several other students were located. Contact was 
made with VI Andreini, V4 Roberts, and Wl Minchey. Several other students 
were in the area also and are listed as witnesses. 
Wilberg indicates that as they approached the other individuals he asked 
Krueger and Sawyers if they wanted him to put "chew" in his mouth. They told 
him that would be good. Wilberg states he did hear Krueger ask other kids 
"if they would put chew under their lip", but he admits that he did offer to 
use chew for the NEWS people and that they did not ask him to chew. Several 
times the NEWS people told them to act like they weren't there so it looked 
like they were doing it on their own. 
Lee indicates that he asked the NEWS people if he could get in trouble for 
using chew on school property and both the lady and the guy told him that he 
could not; that they were with Channel 4 NEWS. The man (Krueger) told him 
that he wanted to see him put the chew in and also wanted to see him spit. 
Lee states he did both but due to the statements the NEWS crew made, he 
didn't think he could get into trouble. 
Andreini states that when the people approached he was told he could be on 
TV if he chewed. Andreini had chewing tobacco in his possession at the time. 
He was asked by Krueger to put chew in his mouth, spit, and "pack the can" 
to be filmed for the interview. He also reports that both Krueger and 
Sawyers asked if other kids on scene would chew for them and also wanted to 
meet some of the baseball kids that chewed. 
Roberts states he was with Andreini when Lee, Wilberg, and the two NEWS 
people arrived. The NEWS lady asked him to chew. Roberts states he asked 
her point blank, "are we going to get in trouble because we are on school 
property?" The lady told him "no", that this was a NEWS story and that the 
school administration said it was O.K. 
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Roberts also indicates that the cameraman wanted chew and took some from 
Roberts. The cameraman placed the chew in his mouth. 
Minchey reports he was in the area when Leef Wilberg, and the NEWS people 
came on scene. They asked him to take a "dip" and to "spit". He did both 
and then left the area to go get lunch. When he returned about 15 minutes 
later everyone was still in the area and the NEWS people were still filming 
and kids were still "dipping", "spitting", and doing other activities related 
to using "smokeless tobacco". He indicates that he heard the cameraman tell 
kids that he wanted them pretend that they are not there. 
Several witnesses support the above statements such as: Leonard, Stansfield, 
Campbell, Kilcrease, and Librarian Brady. 
Numerous statements are attached to this report indicating the above. 
Contact was made with John Edwards the KTVX Station Manager on 02-21-97. Mr. 
Edwards was very cooperative and was aware of the incident. He indicated 
that he would contact their legal advisor and at 3:00 p.m. he called me at 
the Police Department. On the speaker phone were Edwards, Krueger, and 
Sawyers. Everyone was very cooperative. 
Mr. Edwards was asked if he would supply me with the unedited tapes 
concerning the incident and indicated that it was the Station's policy not 
to release unedited tapes. This is common among all stations. 
Both Krueger and Sawyers indicated that they never asked anyone to chew but 
did offer explanations of the interviews after the assembly. Both report 
that Mrs. Ferguson did in fact find two boys to be interviewed and after the 
assembly they did walk into the parking lot and contact other students. Mrs. 
Sawyers indicates that in no way did she or Mr. Krueger tell the students 
they could not get into trouble. She states there is no way she would know 
tfhat the school administration would do. 
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When asked if she asked the kids if they would "stage" using chew, she 
explained the following: "When she met the two boys in the assembly she 
asked them if they chewed. They told her yes. She asked where and when they 
chewed. They told her in the parking lot during lunch, right after the 
assembly. She asked them if they were going to chew this date and was told 
by the boys that they were going to chew this date. She asked them if they 
could take pictures and they told her yes. When they walked into the parking 
lot and met the other students the boys asked her what they were suppose to 
do. Sawyers states she told them that they were observers and not there to 
get them to do anything. She implied that the "chewing" just began to 
occur." 
Krueger was asked if he requested the boys to "pack the can" or spit. He 
states that he never asked anyone to spit but he did see someone "packing the 
can". He had not taken a picture of that activity and asked if the boys 
would do "packing the can" over so he could get a "shot". This happened 
several times. Sawyer states that this type of thing happens all the time, 
when something actually occurs in their presence but they do not get a 
picture, they do ask the person to repeat what they had just done on their 
own to get the picture. She suggested that they really don't "stage" the 
shot but instead ask the person to repeat something they did on their own but 
had not recorded on video. 
Krueger was asked if he were provided some chew. He indicated that he was 
offered chew and did in fact accept. He states he knows that was a mistake. 
Mrs. Sawyer wanted to explain that her goal was to determine if Mr. Bender 
had an effect on kids that actually chew. She asked the kids if they would 
be out in the parking lot if in fact the NEWS crew was not on scene. She was 
told that yes, they would be chewing that lunch hour even if the NEWS crew 
were not on scene. Mrs. Sawyer indicated again that she had no way of 
knowing what the school administration would do and did not tell the kids 
they would not get into trouble. She also states they appeared smart enough 
to know that she had no power over the school administration. 
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I indicated that if Mr. Krueger or Mrs. Sawyers wanted to provide a written 
statement to be submitted to this report they were welcome to do so. They 
indicated they would decide about the written statement prior to Feb. 26, 
1997. 
Additional 
1. The School District charged each student with use of tobacco. Andreini, 
Lee, Wilberg, and Roberts referred to Juv. Court. Minchey cited into Justice 
Court. 
2. Several witness who were in the area have submitted statements: W4 
Brady, W5 Stansfield, W6 campbell, and W7 Kilerease. 
3. Video tape of Channel 4's broadcast was booked into evidence. 
4. The unedited video tape is available at Channel 4 NEWS. However a 
subpoena would be required to obtain this video. 
CASE TO CARBON COUNTY ATTORNEY FOR REVIEW. 
Rulings on Motions to Dismiss 
IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT 
FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAfH 
^ 
L-. 
FILED 
. ; . : ' - 2 iQ98 
SEVENTH DISTRICT 
COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARY A N N ( £ A W Y E R S ^ > 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
DISMISS 
Case No.: 971700508 
On September 12, 1997, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss together with a Memorandum 
in Support. Oral argument on the motion was heard on November 3, 1997, and the court took the 
matter under advisement and now issues this ruling. 
The Information charges the defendant with five counts of Contributing to the Delinquency of 
a Minor, each a Class B Misdemeanor. However, Count IV was later dismissed because the student 
named therein was eighteen years old at the time and therefore not a minor. The offenses allegedly 
took place on February 18, 1997, on the campus of Carbon High School during a KTVX news 
interview with a number of students as a result of which the five students were issued tobacco 
citations. Defendant asserts that the Information should be dismissed because (1) the defendant did 
nothing to contribute to unlawful conduct by the students, and (2) penalizing journalists for exercising 
First Amendment rights is patently unconstitutional. 
I. Does the Defendant's Conduct Violate Sec. 78-3a-801? 
At the outset, the court notes that the four minor students and one 18 year old adult student 
identified in the Information , all of whom were students at Carbon High, were issued tobacco 
citations alleging violation of Section 76-10-105 Utah Code Annotated. A review of that section 
reveals that the essence of that offense lies in the buying, accepting, or possessing of tobacco by 
anyone under the age of 19. It is significant to note that the statute does not specify "use" of tobacco 
as an element of the offense. The gist of the offense lies in the "possessing" of the substance. 
A. Subparagraph (I) 
The State has not disputed the allegation contained in paragraph nine of defendants' 
memorandum to the effect that the tobacco possessed by the minors was not furnished by the 
defendant and there has been no allegation made that the defendant furnished or provided the minors 
with the chewing tobacco. It is also affirmatively alleged numerous times in defendants' 
memorandum and at oral argument that the students already had the tobacco in their possession at 
the time they were approached by the defendant for the interview, which allegations were not 
disputed by the State. 
In reviewing the section under which the defendant is charged, 78-3a-801(l)(a) Utah Code 
Annotated, the court finds that the defendant did not commit the offense stated in subsection (I) for 
the reason that the offense of possession of tobacco had already been committed by the students and 
1 
was in the process of being committed when the students were approached by the defendant. 
B. Subparagraph (ii) 
There is a dispute as to whether the defendant told the five students to chew tobacco on camera. 
Paragraph 11 in the brief states that defendant did not tell the students to chew and that defendant 
said she told the students to "simply do what they would ordinarily do," whereas paragraph nine of 
the brief states that some of the students allege that defendant and the co-defendant asked them to 
chew tobacco on camera. At this stage of the proceedings it is impermissible for the court to 
determine which of the two versions, if either, is correct, and that decision is left to the fact-finder. 
Because the fact-finder could find that the defendant asked the students to chew tobacco on 
camera that was already in the students' possession, the fact-finder could also find that the defendant 
prolonged the time during which the students were committing an ongoing offense, and that by 
prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the defendant tended to cause "minors to 
remain delinquent" in violation of 78-3a-801(l)(ii). 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the defendant did not violate 
Section 78-3a-801 is denied. 
II. Is the Utah Statute Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied? 
Defendant asserts that Section 78-3a-801(l)(a), as applied in this case, violates the defendant's 
First Amendment rights because it is unconstitutionally vague, and specifically argues that the 
language "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent" is too vague to apprise reporters 
that they may be subject to criminal sanctions if they interview juveniles engaged in illegal behavior. 
The court finds that the wording of the statue in question is sufficiently specific to apprise 
reporters of proscribed conduct. The court is mindful that reporters have a constitutionally protected 
right to report illegal activity, but the issue this case presents is whether the defendant as a reporter 
exceeded the scope of that right by allegedly going one step further and engaging in conduct that 
tended to cause minors to engage in the illegal activity being reported or to continue in the illegality. 
Although the defendant urges the court to find that the statue is vague and cites the ruling of an 
Alabama decision involving nearly identical language, the court finds that wording of the statute in 
question is suflBciently specific to apprise reporters of proscribed conduct. The motion to dismiss on 
constitutional grounds is therefore denied. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 1998. 
/2_ £ 
BRYCE K. B&YNER 
District Court Judge 
Oak} Deputy Cter* 
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THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
.JOSEPH K(KRUEGER^, 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
1 DISMISS 
Case No.: 971700509 
On September 12, 1997, the defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss together with a Memorandum 
in Support. Oral argument on the motion was heard on November 3, 1997, and the court took the 
matter under advisement and now issues this ruling. 
The Information charges the defendant with five counts of Contributing to the Delinquency of 
a Minor, each a Class B Misdemeanor. However, Count IV was later dismissed because the student 
named therein was eighteen years old at the time and therefore not a minor. The offenses allegedly 
took place on February 18, 1997, on the campus of Carbon High School during a KTVX news 
interview with a number of students as a result of which the five students were issued tobacco 
citations. Defendant asserts that the Information should be dismissed because (1) the defendant did 
nothing to contribute to unlawful conduct by the students, and (2) penalizing journalists for exercising 
First Amendment rights is patently unconstitutional. 
I. Does the Defendant's Conduct Violate Sec. 78-3a-801? 
At the outset, the court notes that the four minor students and one 18 year old adult student 
identified in the Information, all of whom were students at Carbon High, were issued tobacco 
citations alleging violation of Section 76-10-105 Utah Code Annotated. A review of that section 
reveals that the essence of that offense lies in the buying, accepting, or possessing of tobacco by 
anyone under the age of 19. It is significant to note that the statute does not specify "use" of tobacco 
as an element of the offense. The gist of the offense lies in the "possessing" of the substance. 
A. Subparagraph (I) 
The State has not disputed the allegation contained in paragraph nine of defendants' 
memorandum to the effect that the tobacco possessed by the minors was not furnished by the 
defendant and there has been no allegation made that the defendant furnished or provided the minors 
with the chewing tobacco. It is also affirmatively alleged numerous times in defendants' 
memorandum and at oral argument that the students already had the tobacco in their possession at 
the time they were approached by the defendant for the interview, which allegations were not 
disputed by the State. 
In reviewing the section under which the defendant is charged, 78-3a-801(l)(a) Utah Code 
Annotated, the court finds that the defendant did not commit the offense stated in subsection (I) for 
the reason that the offense of possession of tobacco had already been committed by the students and 
1 
was in the process of being committed when the students were approached by the defendant. 
B. Subparagraph (ii) 
There is a dispute as to whether the defendant told the five students to chew tobacco on camera. 
Paragraph 11 in the brief states that defendant did not tell the students to chew and that defendant 
said she told the students to "simply do what they would ordinarily do," whereas paragraph nine of 
the brief states that some of the students allege that defendant and the co-defendant asked them to 
chew tobacco on camera. At this stage of the proceedings it is impermissible for the court to 
determine which of the two versions, if either, is correct, and that decision is left to the fact-finder. 
Because the fact-finder could find that the defendant asked the students to chew tobacco on 
camera that was already in the students' possession, the fact-finder could also find that the defendant 
prolonged the time during which the students were committing an ongoing offense, and that by 
prolonging the period of unlawful possession of tobacco the defendant tended to cause "minors to 
remain delinquent" in violation of 78-3a-801(l)(ii). 
Based on the foregoing, the Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the defendant did not violate 
Section 78-3a-801 is denied. 
n. Is the Utah Statute Unconstitutionally Vague as Applied? 
Defendant asserts that Section 78-3a-801(l)(a), as applied in this case, violates the defendant's 
First Amendment rights because it is unconstitutionally vague, and specifically argues that the 
language "tends to cause minors to become or remain delinquent" is too vague to apprise reporters 
that they may be subject to criminal sanctions if they interview juveniles engaged in illegal behavior. 
The court finds that the wording of the statue in question is sufficiently specific to apprise 
reporters of proscribed conduct. The court is mindful that reporters have a constitutionally protected 
right to report illegal activity, but the issue this case presents is whether the defendant as a reporter 
exceeded the scope of that right by allegedly going one step further and engaging in conduct that 
tended to cause minors to engage in the illegal activity being reported or to continue in the illegality. 
Although the defendant urges the court to find that the statue is vague and cites the ruling of an 
Alabama decision involving nearly identical language, the court finds that wording of the statute in 
question is sufficiently specific to apprise reporters of proscribed conduct. The motion to dismiss on 
constitutional grounds is therefore denied. 
DATED this 2nd day of January, 1998. 
BRYCE K. &RYNER 
District Court Judge 
******* v* imfip UMKS v*Kn <*p8wet at aba*«-.Mm*o txrapfc t* 
^m.Uf. Jjurtnrzf 
Ctarir / Oapuiv Clerk 
